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Security Games with Decision and Observation Errors
Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract— We study two-player security games which can
be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played
by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is
based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not
have access to each other’s payoff matrix. Each has to observe
the other’s actions up to present and plays the action generated
based on the best response to these observations. However, when
the game is played over a communication network, there are
several practical issues that need to be taken into account:
First, the players may make random decision errors from
time to time. Second, the players’ observations of each other’s
previous actions may be incorrect. The players will try to
compensate for these errors based on the information they
have. We examine convergence property of the game in such
scenarios, and establish convergence to the equilibrium point
under some mild assumptions when both players are restricted
to two actions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has recently been used as an effective tool
to model and solve many security problems in computer
and communication networks. In a noncooperative matrix
game between an Attacker and a Defender, if the payoff
matrices are assumed to be known to both players, each
player can compute the set of Nash equilibria of the game
and play one of these strategies to maximize her expected
gain (or minimize its expected loss)1. However, in practice,
the players do not necessarily have full knowledge of each
other’s payoff function. If the game is repeated, a mechanism
called fictitious play (FP) can be used for each player to learn
her opponent’s motivations. In a FP process, each player
observes all the actions and makes estimates of the mixed
strategy of her opponent. At each stage, she updates this
estimate and plays the pure strategy that is the best response
(or generated based on the best response) to the current
estimate of the other’s mixed strategy. It can be seen that in a
FP process, if one person plays a fixed strategy (either of the
pure or mixed type), the other person’s strategy will converge
to the best response to this fixed strategy. Furthermore, it
has been shown that, for many classes of games, such a FP
process will finally render both players playing the Nash
equilibrium.
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1The problem of each player choosing a Nash equilibrium out of multiple
Nash equilibria is not discussed within the scope of this paper.
In this paper, we examine a two-player game, where
an Attacker (denoted as player 1 or P1) and a Defender
(denoted as player 2 or P2) participate in a discrete-time
repeated nonzero-sum matrix game. In a general setting, the
Attacker has m possible actions and the Defender has n
posssible actions to choose from. When such a security game
is played between two automated systems over a network,
in order to have a good model, we have to take into account
several practical issues. First, the players may make random
decision errors from time to time. Instead of playing an
action aji that is the output of the best-response computation,
player i may play another action aki with some probability
(which is typically small for functional systems). Second,
the observation that each player makes on her opponent’s
actions may also be incorrect, which will definitely affect
her own responding actions. There are many factors giving
rise to these problems: The non-idealiality of electronic and
software systems, the uncertain and noisy characteristic of
observation data, and the erroneous nature of the channels
on which commands and observations are communicated, to
name a few.
It is these scenarios that we aim to address in this
paper. We examine convergence of players’ strategies in the
FP process with decision and observation errors. If these
strategies do converge, we quantify the new Nash equilibrium
and thus estimate how these decision and observation errors
affect the learning process and the equilibrium of the game.
Security games have been examined extensively in a
number of papers, see for example, [1]–[4]. The work in
[5] employs the framework of Bayesian games to address
the intrusion detection problem in wireless ad hoc networks.
In [6], the author examines the intrusion detection problem
in heterogenous networks as a nonzero-sum static game. The
work in [7] addresses this problem using the framework of
zero-sum stochastic games [8]. In [9], we develop a network
model based on linear influence networks that allows us to
take into consideration the correlation among the nodes in
terms of both security assets and vulnerabilities.
Relevant literature on fictitious play can be found in [10]–
[16]. For two-player zero-sum classical FP, the convergence
proof was obtained for arbitrary numbers of actions for each
player (m×n) [10]. For nonzero-sum games, the proofs for
two-player FP have been found for the case where one player
is restricted to two actions (See [12] for classical FP and [13]
for stochastic FP). In [19], we address the classical FP and
stochastic FP with imperfect observations for the case where
each player is restricted to two actions.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. First, we
formulate the repeated security games where players make
random decision errors as a fictitious play process. We
discuss the convergence of such games in the general case
with arbitrary numbers of actions for each player. We then
establish the convergence property for several classes of
games with decision errors where both players are restricted
to two actions. Second, we examine the fictitious play
process where the players’ observations are imperfect and
the players try to compensate for the observation errors. We
again establish the convergence property for the case where
both players are restricted to two actions. We point out a
number of scenarios that can be considered as special cases
of this result.
In Section II, we introduce some background and notation
adopted from [13], [14]. The analysis for the stochastic FP
with decision errors is presented in Section III. In Section
IV, we address the FP with observation errors. Finally, some
concluding remarks end the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Static games
We present an overview of some concepts for static
security games, where player P1 has m and player P2 has n
possible actions. In equations written for the generic player
Pi, i = 1, 2, we use k to denote m or n. Denote by
p1 ∈ ∆(m) and p2 ∈ ∆(n) a pair of mixed strategies for P1
and P2, respectively, where ∆(k) is the simplex in ℜk, i.e.,
∆(k) ≡

s ∈ ℜk|sj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , k,
k∑
j=1
sj = 1

 . (1)
The utility function of Pi, Ui(pi, p−i), is given by 2
Ui(pi, p−i) = p
T
i Mip−i + τiH(pi), (2)
where Mi is the payoff matrix of Pi, i = 1, 2, and H :
Int(∆(k)) → R is the entropy function of the probability
vector pi: H(pi) = −pTi log(pi) (Note that M1 is of
dimension m × n and M2 n × m). The weighted entropy
τiH(pi) with τi ≥ 0 is introduced to boost mixed strategies.
In a security game, τi represents how much player i wants
to randomize its actions, and thus is not necessarily known
to the other player. Also, for τ1 = τ2 = 0 (referred to as
classical FP), the best response mapping can be set-valued,
while it has a unique value when τi > 0 (referred to as
stochastic FP) [4] [14]. For a static game, each player selects
an integer action ai according to the mixed strategy pi. The
(instant) payoff for player Pi is vTaiMiva−i +τiH(pi), where
we use vj , j = 1, . . . , k, to indicate the jth vertex of the
simplex ∆(k) (For example, when k = 2, v1 = [1 0]T for
the first action, and v2 = [0 1]T for the second action). For
a pair of mixed strategies (p1, p2), the utility functions are
given by the expected payoffs:
Ui(pi, p−i) = E
[
vTaiMiva−i
]
+ τiH(pi). (3)
2As standard in the game theory literature, the index −i is used to indicate
those of other players, or the opponent’s in this case.
Now, the best response mappings β1 : ∆(n) → ∆(m) and
β2 : ∆(m)→ ∆(n) are defined as:
βi(p−i) = arg max
pi∈∆(k)
Ui(pi, p−i). (4)
If τi > 0, from (4), the best response is unique as mentioned
earlier, and is given by the soft-max function:
βi(p−i) = σ
(
Mip−i
τi
)
, (5)
where the soft-max function σ : ℜk → Interior(∆(k)) is
defined as
(σ(x))j =
exj∑k
j=1 e
xj
, j = 1, . . . , k. (6)
Note that (σ(x))j > 0, and thus the range of the soft-max
function is just the interior of the simplex.
Finally, a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is defined to
be a pair (p∗1, p∗2) ∈ ∆(m) × ∆(n) such that for all p1 ∈
∆(m) and p2 ∈ ∆(n)
Ui(pi, p
∗
−i) ≤ Ui(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i). (7)
We can also write a Nash equilibrium (p∗1, p∗2) as the fixed
point of the best response mappings:
p∗i = βi(p
∗
−i). (8)
B. Fictitious play
1) Discrete-Time Fictitious Play: From the static game
described in Subsection II-A, we define discrete-time FP as
follows. Suppose that the game is repeated at times k ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .}. The empirical frequency qi(k) of player Pi is
given by
qi(k + 1) =
1
k + 1
k∑
j=0
vai(j) (9)
Using induction, we can prove the following recursive rela-
tion:
qi(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
qi(k) +
1
k + 1
vai(k). (10)
At time k, player Pi picks the best response to the empirical
frequency of the opponent’s actions:
pi(k) = βi(q−i(k)). (11)
2) Continuous-Time Fictitious Play: From the equations
of discrete-time FP (9), (10), the continuous-time version of
the iteration can be stated as follows ( [13], [14], also see
[15], [19] for the derivation):
p˙i(t) = βi(p−i(t))− pi(t), i = 1, 2. (12)
C. Algorithms
We present in this subsection two algorithms for discrete-
time stochastic FP. Algorithm II-C.1, derived from [13], [14],
[19], is used for the case when players’ observations are
considered to be perfect or when they have no estimates of
observation errors. Algorithm II-C.2, a generalized version
of the one in [19], is used for players who have estimates of
observation errors and want to compensate for these errors.
1) Stochastic FP with perfect observations: In stochastic
FP, at time k, player i, i = 1, 2, carries out the following
steps:
1) Update the empirical frequency of the opponent using
(10).
2) Compute the best response βi(q−i(k)) using (5). (Note
that the result is always a completely mixed strategy.)
3) Generate an action ai(k) using the mixed strategy
from step (2), ai(k) = rand [βi(q−i(k))], where
we use rand to denote the randomizer function that
gives ai(k) such that the expectation E [ai(k)] =
βi(q−i(k)).
2) Stochastic FP with imperfect observations: At time k,
player i, i = 1, 2, carries out the following steps:
1) Update the observed frequency of the opponent q
−i
using (10).
2) Compute the estimated frequency
q−i = f−i(q−i). (13)
3) Compute the best response βi(q−i(k)) using (5). (Note
that the result is always a completely mixed strategy.)
4) Generate an action ai(k) using the mixed strategy from
step (3), ai(k) = rand[βi(q−i(k))].
D. A convergence result for m = n = 2 with perfect
observations
We restate the following theorem from [13], [19], for the
general case where the coefficients of the entropy terms
for the players (τ1 and τ2) are not necessarily equal (Cf.
Equation (2)). This theorem in [13] is stated for τ1 = τ2,
however, one can always scale the payoff matrices to get the
general case.
Theorem 1: (A variant of Theorem 3.2 [13] for general
τ1, τ2 > 0.) Consider a two-player two-action fictitious play
process with (LT M˜1L)(LTM˜2L) 6= 0, where M˜i are the
payoff matrices of Pi, i = 1, 2 and L := (1, −1)T . The
solutions of continuous-time FP (12) satisfy
lim
t→∞
(p1(t)− β1(p2(t))) = 0 (14)
lim
t→∞
(p2(t)− β2(p1(t))) = 0, (15)
where βi(p−i), i = 1, 2, are given in (5).
III. SECURITY GAMES WITH DECISION ERRORS
In this section, we consider the situations where players
are not totally rational or the channels carrying commands
are error prone. Specifically, P1 makes decision errors with
probabilities αij ’s where αij , i, j = 1 . . .m, is the proba-
bility that P1 intends to play action i but ends up playing
action j, αij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 αij = 1, i = 1 . . .m. Similarly,
P2’s decision error probabilities are given by ǫij , ǫij ≥ 0,∑m
j=1 ǫij = 1, i = 1 . . . n. This is called “trembling hand”
problem in the game theory literature (See for example, Ref-
erence [17], Subsection 3.5.5). The decision error matrices
D1 and D2 are given below.
D1 =


α11 α12 . . . α1m
α21 α22 . . . α2m
. . .
αm1 αm2 . . . αmm

 , (16)
D2 =


ǫ11 ǫ12 . . . ǫ1n
ǫ21 ǫ22 . . . ǫ2n
. . .
ǫn1 ǫn2 . . . ǫnn

 . (17)
When m = n = 2, the decision error matrices can be
written as:
D1 =
(
1− α γ
α 1− γ
)
, D2 =
(
1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
)
(18)
The decision errors of each player in this case are illustrated
in Figure 1. In what follows, we state two standard results
in digital communications. The proofs are similar to those
for the case m = n = 2 in [19].
Proposition 1: Consider the two-player discrete-time fic-
titious play with decision errors where the error probabilities
are given in Equations (16) and (17). Let α˜ij , i, j = 1 . . .m,
and ǫ˜ij , i, j = 1 . . . n, be the empirical decision error
frequencies of P1 and P2, respectively. If decision errors
are assumed to be independent from stage to stage, it holds
that
lim
k→∞
a.s. α˜ij = αij , i, j = 1 . . .m,
lim
k→∞
a.s. ǫ˜ij = ǫij , i, j = 1 . . . n. (19)
where we use lim a.s. to denote almost sure convergence.
Proposition 2: Consider a two-player discrete-time ficti-
tious play with decision errors where the error probabilities
are given in Equations (16) and (17). Let qi be the empirical
frequency of player i’s real actions and qi be the frequency
of player i’s intended actions (generated from the best
response at each stage). If decision errors are assumed to
be independent from stage to stage, it holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. qi = Di( lim
k→∞
a.s. qi), i = 1, 2, (20)
where Di are the decision error matrices given in Equations
(16) and (17).
A. If the players know their own decision error probabilities
We first consider the case where the players both have
complete information about the decision error matrices Di,
i = 1, 2. If they both also know the payoff matrices Mi, i =
1, 2, then each can compute and play one of the Nash
equilibria right from beginning. The problem then can be
considered as a stochastic version of the trembling hand
problem. Specifically, suppose that each player still wants
to randomize their empirical frequency pi (instead of the
frequency of their intended actions, or intended frequency,
pi) by including an entropy term in their utility function, we
have that
Ui(pi, p−i) = p
T
i M˜ip−i + τiH(Dipi), i = 1, 2, (21)
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 1. The case m = n = 2 where players make decision errors with
probabilities α, γ, ǫ, and µ.
where pi’s are intended frequencies, M˜1 = DT1 M1D2 and
M˜2 = D
T
2 M2D1 (These are the payoff matrices resulted
from decision errors using the results in Propositions 1 and 2,
see for example [17] for derivation). Using pi := Dipi, i =
1, 2, the utility functions now can be written as
Ui(pi, p−i) = p
T
i Mip−i + τiH(pi), i = 1, 2. (22)
The game is thus reduced to the one without decision errors
and the Nash Equilibrium of the static game is known from
Subsection II-A to satisfy:
p∗i = βi(p
∗
−i), i = 1, 2, (23)
or equivalently (with the assumption that Di’s are invertible):
p∗i = (Di)
−1βi(D−ip
∗
−i), i = 1, 2. (24)
The best response is now given as
pi = (Di)
−1βi(p−i) = (Di)
−1σ
(
Mip−i
τi
)
. (25)
In the corresponding FP process (the “trembling hand
stochastic FP”), as each player Pi can observe her oppo-
nent’s empirical frequency p
−i, she does not need to know
D−i to compute the best response. We thus state below a
convergence result for the FP process with decision errors
for the case m = n = 2.
Proposition 3: Consider a two-player two-action fictitious
play process where players make decision errors with in-
vertible decision error matrices D1 and D2, respectively.
Suppose that at each step, each player calculates the best
response taking into account their own decision errors using
Equation (25). If (LTM1L)(LTM2L) 6= 0, L := (1, −1)T ,
the solutions of the continuous-time FP process with decision
errors will satisfy
lim
t→∞
p1(t) = D
−1
1 σ
(
M1D2 limt→∞ p2(t)
τ1
)
,
lim
t→∞
p2(t) = D
−1
2 σ
(
M2D1 limt→∞ p1(t)
τ2
)
. (26)
where σ(.) is the soft-max function defined in (6).
Proof: The proof can be obtained using Theorem 1 and
the fact pi := Dipi, i = 1, 2.
It thus can be seen that with knowledge of their own
decision errors, players can completely precompensate for
these errors and the equilibrium empirical frequencies remain
the same as those of the original game without decision
errors.
B. If the players are unaware of all the decision error
probabilities
We consider in this subsection a two-player fictitious
play process with decision errors where the decision error
probabilities are not known to both players. Each player
plays the regular stochastic FP Algorithm II-C.1. We are
interested in whether or not the FP process will converge,
and when it does, what the equilibrium will be. We first
examine the general case with arbitrary m, n, and then the
special case where m = n = 2. We first use Proposition 2
and the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3 [19] to
approximate the discrete-time FP with the continuous-time
version. At time step k, as each player Pi generates her action
vai(k) based on the best response to her opponent’s empirical
frequency q
−i, the expectation of vai(k), i = 1, 2, will be
given by
E
[
va1(k)
]
= D1β1(q2(k)),
E[va2(k)] = D2β2(q1(k)),
where D1 and D2 account for decision errors. The mean
dynamic of the empirical frequencies then can be written as
follows
q1(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q1(k) +
1
k + 1
D1β1(q2(k)),
q2(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q2(k) +
1
k + 1
D2β2(q1(k)). (27)
From the mean dynamic, we can derive the continuous-time
approximation (See [20] for the derivation):
p˙1(t) = D1β1(p2(t)) − p1(t),
p˙2(t) = D2β2(p1(t)) − p2(t). (28)
It can be seen that a pair of mixed strategies (p∗1, p∗2) that
satisfies
p∗1(t) = D1β1(p
∗
2(t)),
p∗2(t) = D2β2(p
∗
1(t)).
will be an equilibrium point of the dynamics (28). For
some results on the stability of the equilibrium point in
the continuous-time system and the discrete-time system for
general values of m and n, we refer to [20]. When m =
n = 2, it turns out the point (p∗1, p∗2) is globally stable for
the continuous-time system under some mild assumptions.
We thus state the following theorem for this special case.
Theorem 2: Consider a two-player two-action fictitious
play process where players make decision errors with de-
cision error matrices D1 and D2, respectively. Suppose that
the players are unaware of all the decision error probabilities
and use the regular stochastic FP algorithm II-C.1. If Di, i =
1, 2, are invertible and (LTM1D2L)(LTM2D1L) 6= 0, the
solutions of continuous-time FP process with decision errors
(28) will satisfy
lim
t→∞
p1(t) = D1σ
(
M1 limt→∞ p2(t)
τ1
)
,
lim
t→∞
p2(t) = D2σ
(
M2 limt→∞ p1(t)
τ2
)
. (29)
where σ(.) is the soft-max function defined in (6).
Proof: The proof, some remarks, and a numerical
example can be found in [20].
IV. SECURITY GAMES WITH OBSERVATION ERRORS
In [19], we study the effect of observation errors on
convergence to the NE in a 2× 2 FP process. We also prove
that if each player has a correct estimate of error probabilities
of observations, they can reverse the effect of the channel to
obtain the NE of the original static game. In this section,
we present a generalized version of these results. Consider a
two-player fictitious play game with imperfect observations
where the error channels are given in Equations (30) and
(31).
C1 =


α11 α12 . . . α1m
α21 α22 . . . α2m
. . .
αm1 αm2 . . . αmm

 , (30)
C2 =


ǫ11 ǫ12 . . . ǫ1n
ǫ21 ǫ22 . . . ǫ2n
. . .
ǫn1 ǫn2 . . . ǫnn

 , (31)
where αij , i, j = 1 . . .m is the probability that P1’s action
i is erroneously observed as action j, αij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 αij =
1, i = 1 . . .m, and ǫij , i, j = 1 . . . n is the probability that
P2’s action i is erroneously observed as action j, ǫij ≥ 0,∑m
j=1 ǫij = 1, i = 1 . . . n. Suppose that the players have
their estimates of the errror probabilities as follows:
C1 =


α11 α12 . . . α1m
α21 α22 . . . α2m
. . .
αm1 αm2 . . . αmm

 , (32)
C2 =


ǫ11 ǫ12 . . . ǫ1n
ǫ21 ǫ22 . . . ǫ2n
. . .
ǫn1 ǫn2 . . . ǫnn

 , (33)
where αij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 αij = 1, i = 1 . . .m, and ǫij ≥ 0,∑m
j=1 ǫij = 1, i = 1 . . . n. We first restate Propositions
1 and 2 in the context of repeated games with imperfect
observations.
Proposition 4: Consider the two-player discrete-time fic-
titious play with imperfect observations where error proba-
bilities are given in Equations (30) and (31). Let α˜ij , i, j =
1 . . .m, and ǫ˜ij , i, j = 1 . . . n, be the empirical error
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Fig. 2. Players observe their opponent’s actions through binary channels
with error probabilities α, γ, ǫ, and µ.
frequencies of observations on P1’s and P2’s actions, re-
spectively. If channel errors are assumed to be independent
from stage to stage, it holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. α˜ij = αij , i, j = 1 . . .m,
lim
k→∞
a.s. ǫ˜ij = ǫij , i, j = 1 . . . n. (34)
where we use lim a.s. to denote almost sure convergence.
Proposition 5: Consider the two-player discrete-time fic-
titious play with imperfect observations where error prob-
abilities are given in Equations (30) and (31). Let qi be
the observed frequency and qi be the empirical frequency
of player i. If channel errors are assumed to be independent
from stage to stage, it holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. qi = Ci( lim
k→∞
a.s. qi), i = 1, 2, (35)
where Ci are the channel error matrices given in Equations
(30) and (31).
If both players have their estimates of the errror probabili-
ties as in Equations (32) and (33), they can play the stochastic
FP algorithm given in II-C.2 with f−i(q−i) = (Ci)−1q−i
to compensate for observation errors (Using the results in
Propositions 4 and 5). Again we can use the same procedure
as in Subsection III-B to approximate the discrete-time FP
with the continuous-time version.
q1(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q1(k)
+
1
k + 1
σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2q2(k)
τ1
)
,
q2(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q2(k)
+
1
k + 1
σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1q1(k)
τ2
)
.
The continuous-time approximation is given by:
p˙1(t) = σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2p2(t)
τ1
)
− p1(t),
p˙2(t) = σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1p1(t)
τ2
)
− p2(t). (36)
It can be seen that a pair of mixed strategies (q∗1 , q∗2) that
satisfies
p∗1(t) = σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2p
∗
2(t)
τ1
)
,
p∗2(t) = σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1p
∗
1(t)
τ2
)
.
will be an equilibrium point of the dynamics (36). For
some results on the stability of the equilibrium point in
the continuous-time system and the discrete-time system
for general values of m and n, we refer to [20]. When
m = n = 2, again the point (p∗1, p∗2) is globally stable for
the continuous-time system under some mild assumptions.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Consider a two-player two-action fictitious
play game with imperfect observations where the error
channels are given in Figure 2 and Equation (37).
C1 =
(
1− α γ
α 1− γ
)
, C2 =
(
1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
)
(37)
Suppose that the players have their estimates of the errror
probabilities as follows:
C1 =
(
1− α γ
α 1− γ
)
, C2 =
(
1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
)
(38)
The players then play the stochastic FP given in II-C.2. If
(LTM1(C2)
−1C2L)(L
TM2(C1)
−1C1L) 6= 0, the solutions
of continuous-time FP with imperfect observations (12) will
satisfy
lim
t→∞
p1(t) = σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2 limt→∞ p2(t)
τ1
)
,
lim
t→∞
p2(t) = σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1 limt→∞ p1(t)
τ2
)
. (39)
where σ(.) is the soft-max function defined in (6).
Proof: The proof, some remarks, and a numerical example
can be found in [20].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced and discussed some
repeated security game models that take into account players’
decision errors and observation errors. Each player does not
have access to her opponent’s payoff matrix and thus has
to learn this through the fictitious play process. However, in
a practical setting, each player is expected to make random
decision errors from time to time and also has to respond
to imperfectly observed actions of the other player. We have
studied the convergence property of such games and, if the
FP process does converge, quantified the new equilibrium.
Such analyses will help provide guidelines for players to
maximize their gain or minimize their loss in a nonideal
environment.
We normally start from the mean dynamics of the discrete-
time version of a game, proceed to continuous-time approx-
imation and then analyze convergence of this continuous-
time version. Although the convergence of the continuous-
time fictitious play does not guarantee the almost sure
convergence of the discrete-time counterpart, it does provide
the necessary limiting results for the discrete-time version.
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